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NOTE
IGNORANCE IS NOT BLISS: WHY A
BAN ON HUMAN CLONING IS
UNACCEPTABLE
Shannon H. Smitht
CLONING IS NOT A NEW TECHNIQUE. In fact, clones,
"precise genetic cop[ies] of a molecule, cell, plant, animal, or hu-
man being,"1 have been around for years. Genetically identical
copies of whole organisms in plant breeding, known as varieties,
are commonplace. Additionally, some forms of invertebrates, such
as certain kinds of worms, can regenerate another entire organism
from a small piece of themselves.3 While vertebrates do not have
this ability, the cloning of vertebrates does occur naturally through
the formation and birth of identical twins.4
The first artificially occurring clone was created in the 1970s
when Dr. John Gurdon successfully cloned a frog.5 Dr. Gurdon
replaced the nucleus of an embryonic frog cell, much larger and
easier to manipulate than those of mammals, with that of another
cell from a different frog. Although the frogs never reached adult-
t B.A., North Carolina State University, 1996; J.D. Candidate, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, 1999. The Author would like to thank Professor
Maxwell Mehlman for his invaluable comments and accessibility, and Chet Aaron
Smith for his encouragement and support throughout the writing of this Note.
1 NAT'L BIoETlncs ADVISORY COMM'N, 1 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 1, 13
(1997) [hereinafter NBAC] (stating that cloning has been an agricultural practice for
many years and is a foundation of modem biological research).
See id. at 14.
3 See id. (noting that regeneration from a small piece is not necessarily an in-
vertebrate worm's usual mode of reproduction).
4 See id. (indicating that there is a natural form of cloning by humans and other
mammals, but it occurs by chance with the separation of a single embryo into halves
during early development).
Discussion of Dr. Gurdon's experiments with frogs is attributed to Michael
Specter & Gina Kolata, After Decades of Missteps, How Cloning Succeeded, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1997, at Al.
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hood, the technology was a breakthrough. Repeated attempts at
transferring nuclei from adult cells into egg cells followed, but the
frogs only developed into tadpoles and they always died.
After a drought in cloning advances during the 1980s, accom-
panied by the discouraging attempts at trying to replicate what
turned out to be fraudulent results in an experiment purported to
have cloned mice, many scientists felt that the cloning of mammals
by simple nuclear transfer was impossible.6 In 1994, however, four
calves were created in Dr. Neal First's Wisconsin laboratory after
a staff member mistakenly forgot to provide the nourishing serum
to the cells.7 Without the serum, the cells were starved of essential
nutrients and were forced into a type of hibernating state.
While Dr. First and his colleagues did not realize the signifi-
cance of this fact, Drs. Ian Wilmut and Keith Campbell tried the
starvation approach on embryo cells in 1996 and produced Megan
and Morag, the world's first cloned sheep. 8 Thus, the discovery of
this starvation technique resolved a major obstacle to cloning: the
problem of coordinating the cycles of the donor cell with the re-
cipient egg.9 This team of scientists attempted next to clone the
first adult mammal and succeeded in 1997 with the birth of Dolly,
a lamb created from the udder cells of a six-year-old sheep. Megan
and Morag, Dolly's predecessors, had been created through the
proven technique of using embryonic donor cells that had not be-
gun to go through the process of specialization. Dolly, on the other
hand, was the first mammal created with the use of adult, differen-
tiated donor cells.
Recently, scientists in Oregon have stated that they have suc-
cessfully cloned rhesus monkeys from very early embryo cells.'
0
While this accomplishment is not the same as cloning the more
sophisticated cells of an adult mammal, as Drs. Wilmut and
Campbell were able to do in creating Dolly, the cloning of pri-
mates does move the technology closer to cloning human beings.
In fact one Chicago scientist, Dr. Richard Seed, announced at a
6 See id. at B6.
7 See id. at B7.
8 For a discussion on the techniques used by Drs. Wilmut and Campell in the
creation of Megan and Morag, see GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD To DOLLY, AND
THE PATH AHEAD 206-08 (1998).
9 See Specter & Kolata, supra note 5, at B7 (noting that the techniques used in
producing Megan and Morag laid the foundation for the creation of Dolly).
1o See Philip Cohen, Crossing the Line, N. SCBNTIST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 4 (stating
that Don Wolf, the scientist who cloned the two rhesus monkeys, planned to attempt
the cloning of primates from the developed adult cells later that year).
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seminar in December, 1997 that he will produce a human clone
within two years. 1 With the prospect of cloning human beings
more apparent, many legal, ethical, and moral arguments are being
raised concerning the use of the technology.
Society has rushed to understand the science of cloning and
address the issues the technology raises, primarily due to the pros-
pect of scientists like Dr. Seed proceeding with attempts at cloning
human beings. Since Dolly was announced in 1997, there has been
an enormous public outcry against the possibility of human clon-
ing, based largely on moral arguments and scientific ignorance.
For the most part, the academic approaches have been centered on
either ethical or scientific discussion. This Note will address the
cloning debate by examining both the scientific process and the
ethical arguments from a legal viewpoint.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the legal and ethical
implications of cloning human beings in light of the recent ad-
vances in the science that have made cloning humans a realistic
possibility. The first part of the Note will be a discussion of the
basic science involved in the cloning technology that produced
Dolly, and the important advances in science over the past three
decades that have lead to the current state of the technology. This
discussion will be followed by a brief section outlining some of
the proposed international and domestic regulations on human
cloning. The third and most substantive portion of the Note will
focus on the legal issues involved in cloning humans for both re-
productive and non-reproductive purposes. This section will in-
clude not only the constitutional arguments for cloning, but also
the discussion of analogous situations in case law. Ultimately, this
Note concludes that outright bans on human cloning, especially as
worded in proposed legislation, are neither appropriate nor in the
best interest of society as a whole in the United States.
11 See Marilynn Marchione, Humans May Be Cloned Soon, Scientist Claims.
Biologist Shocks Colleagues with News of Project in Chicago, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Dec. 6, 1997, at 1 (reporting on Dr. Richard Seed's announcement at a
seminar on the ethics and moral dilemmas of cloning and other reproductive tech-
niques). Seed, a Harvard-educated researcher specializing in embryology and infer-
tility, says he has already assembled an eight-member team and interviewed prospec-
tive clients to be cloned. He states that he hopes to offer cloning to infertile couples
through a commercial venture.
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I. THE SCIENCE OF CLONING
There are three basic types of cloning: molecular, cellular, and
nuclear transplantation. 12 In molecular cloning, deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) fragments containing genes are copied and amplified
in a host cell. 13 This process makes large quantities of identical
DNA possible for scientific experiments and is the mainstay of
recombinant DNA technology. Cellular cloning, another highly
reliable technique, is the process of copying cells from the body by
growing them in culture in a laboratory. 14 Neither molecular nor
cellular cloning, by scientific definition, involves the use of germ
cells (eggs or sperm). Because of this fact, resulting cloned cells
from either technique do not have the capability to develop into
embryos.
Nuclear transplantation cloning, the technique that created
Dolly, was developed in the early 1980s. There are five main steps
in this type of cloning process: (1) acquiring acceptable donor and
recipient cells, (2) nuclear transfer, (3) cellular fusion, (4) activa-
tion, and (5) implantation. To begin the process, donor and recipi-
ent cells must meet certain criteria. Recipient eggs need to be enu-
cleated and unfertilized in order to be fully receptive of the donor
cells. Early experiments attempting to find donor cells used egg
cells that had not begun to grow or divide due to the fact that these
cells had not yet taken on special properties to develop as special-
ized cells.'t Since the science has advanced, mature, differentiated
donor cells can now be taken to fuse with a recipient egg cell be-
cause each cell, regardless of age, carries a full complement of
DNA. 16 For example, skin cells, which have "turned off' parts of
the DNA code in order to become skin cells (rather than cells of
another body part such as the liver or heart), can still be used as
donor cells since the "turned off' material is retained in the cell
after the cell goes through that specialization process. Donor cells
must be somatic cells, "any cell other than a germ cell,"' 7 thus
12 See NBAC, supra note 1, at 14-15.
13 See id. at 14 (identifying molecular cloning as the simplest and most routine
of the three basic types of cloning).
14 See id. (explaining that the genetic make-up of the cellularly cloned cell is
identical to that of the original).
15 See Specter & Kolata, supra note 5, at B6. For a more detailed discussion on
the history of cloning, see KOLATA, supra note 8.
16 See Specter & Kolata, supra note 5, at B6 (discussing the differences between
the nucleus of a mature cell and the nucleus of an embryo).
17 NBAC, supra note 1, at appendix 3 (providing definitions of scientific terms).
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giving rise to the other common name for nuclear transplantation
cloning, somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT).
After acceptable donor and recipient cells are obtained, nu-
clear transfer must occur. In nuclear transfer, it is important that
the cycles of the donor cells and the recipient egg are coordinated
in order to ensure that the donor nucleus can be fully "repro-
grammed" by the egg, permitting the activation and replication of
the entire complement of DNA.18 In order to achieve this synchro-
nization, the donor cell is starved of essential nutrients to force it
into a state of hibernation. When the egg's cycle coordinates with
the cycle of the hibernating donor, which has been "frozen in
time" by the starvation, nuclear transfer is performed. The nuclei
of both the donor cell and recipient egg are removed, and the do-
nor cell's nucleus is then introduced into the recipient egg.
19
Cellular fusion and activation, the next two steps in the clon-
ing process, were problematic for scientists until the advent of
electrofusion. Early attempts at fusing the donor nucleus into the
recipient egg included using an inactivated Sendai virus to facili-
tate fusion.20 The virus, introduced to the donor nucleus and re-
cipient egg prior to nuclear transfer, melts into the membranes of
the two cells. 21 Because the virus recognizes itself in the other
cell's membrane, it divides across the cell membranes, thus fusing
the cells together as it multiplies. The technique was considered to
be very effective, however, the resulting fetuses were often still-
born due to the effects of the virus.22 Currently, electrofusion is the
preferred method. A quick pulse of electric current serves to fuse
the cells and activate the egg simultaneously. 23 The electric cur-
rent, in activating the egg, acts as the trigger to the growth process
of the newly created cell. Finally, the resulting blastocyst, the "de-
18 See id. at 20-21 (explaining that "any nucleus that has initiated replication
before transfer will end up with too much DNA, which will likely result in anoma-
lies").
19 For more extensive and detailed scientific explanation of the procedures of
nuclear transfer, see Campell et al., Sheep Cloned by Nuclear Transfer From a Cul-
tured Cell Line, NATURE, Mar. 7, 1996, at 64-66.
20 See KOLATA, supra note 8, at 123, 182-83.
21 See id.
22 See id. at 183 (noting that the cells did not "immediately die," but they were
"fatally injured").
23 See NBAC, supra note 1, at 19 (explaining that because electrofusion uses
two cells instead of one, all of the cellular components are transferred, resulting in a
cell with a mixture of mitochondria from both the donor and the recipient).
1999]
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veloping preimplantation embryo,, 24 is implanted into the surro-
gate's uterus following procedures commonly utilized in in vitro
fertilization (IVF) technology.
There were several key scientific advances in the past three
decades that have enabled cloning technology to develop to its cur-
rent state of the art. Beginning in the 1970s, the development of
nuclear transfer technology helped launch cloning past traditional
blastomere separation science. "In blastomere separation, the de-
veloping embryo is split very soon after fertilization when it is
composed of two to eight cells."5 Each cell, called a blastomere, is
then able to produce a new individual. Nuclear transfer, unlike
blastomere separation, does not require sexual reproduction for the
formation of the blastocyst.26 It facilitates the taking of one cell's
nucleus (the donor's) and implanting that nucleus into an egg cell
so that the nucleus directs the development of the resulting blasto-
cyst. Therefore, nuclear transfer allows for reproduction where
there is a single genetic parent.
Another scientific advance that was crucial to the develop-
ment of cloning technology was in vitro fertilization technology
perfected during the 1980s. IVF involves the creation of an em-
bryo in a laboratory followed by the implantation of the embryo
into a female's uterus for gestation. This procedure enables scien-
tists to perform nuclear transfer and cellular fusion outside of the
female body. A female, however, may be suitable for surrogacy,
but not for providing the recipient egg, or vice versa. IVF helps
alleviate these types of infertility problems by allowing for the
creation of an embryo, using sperm and egg cells from two indi-
viduals, and gestation by a third individual. For cloning purposes,
IVF gives scientists the ability to create the blastocyst in a labora-
tory, containing the genetic material of a single individual, and
then implant it into the female's uterus to grow and develop natu-
rally.
Finally, the most critical advance for allowing the use of adult
cells as donor cells is the discovery by Drs. Wilmut and Campbell
24 Id. at appendix 1 (defining a "developing preimplementation embryo," or
"blastocyst," as "beginning 4 days after fertilization," and consisting of "a sphere of
cells made up of an outer layer of support cells, a fluid-filled cavity, and a cluster of
cells on the interior").
25 Id. at 15 (noting that the blastomeres are considered totipotent in that "they
possess the total potential to make a new organism").
26 See id. at 15 (explaining that nuclear transplantation cloning results in a single
genetic parent).
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of the starvation technique. In order to resolve the problems of co-
ordinating the cycles of the donor and recipient cells, the scientists
"greatly reduce[d] serum concentration for five days," 27 thereby
starving the adult donor cells of essential nutrients that help con-
tinue their development cycle. Without the starvation technique,
there had not been a successful attempt at using adult, differenti-
ated cells for donor cells. Synchronization of the cycles of the do-
nor nucleus and recipient egg is vital to permit the cells to grow
and divide at the same rate, resulting in a whole new set of chro-
mosomes each time.28 If the cycles are not coordinated at the same
rate, the division will not result in a whole new set of chromo-
somes and the "clone" will not mature or survive.
H. PROPOSED REGULATIONS ON HUMAN
CLONING
Currently, there are numerous state and federal proposals for
regulating the cloning of human beings. Most attempt an outright
ban on human cloning or the use of government funds for cloning
humans. President Clinton, in a press conference on March 4,
27 Specter & Kolata, supra note 5, at B7 (quoting Dr. Wilmut on the patented
cloning approach).
28 Id. at B6-7 (stating that Dr. Campbell accomplished the coordination of this
donor nucleus and recipient egg cycles by slowing down the cellular activity).
29 See, e.g., S. 368, 105th Cong. (1997) (banning the use of federal funds for
cloning); H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997) (banning the use of funds made available by
any Federal law for human cloning); H.R. 3133, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (prohibiting
the use of Federal funds for research on cloning humans); H.R. 923, 105 th Cong. § 2
(1997) (outlawing the use of a somatic cell for the production of a human clone); S.
1599, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer tech-
nology for human cloning); S. 1601, 105th Cong. (1998) (prohibiting the use of so-
matic cell nuclear transfer technology for human cloning); S. 1574, 105th Cong. § 3
(1998) (prohibiting the cloning of humans); S. 1602, 105th Cong. (1998) (prohibiting
any attempt to clone humans using somatic cell nuclear transfer and the use of Fed-
eral funds for such a purpose); H.R. 1082, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997) (banning the
use of government funds for any research on cloned cells or tissue); S. 1230, 90th
Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1997) (making illegal the cloning of a human being, or
allowing public funds to be used for such a purpose); H.R. 1237, 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1997) (banning the cloning of DNA from human beings); A.B. 1251, 1997-98
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (proposing a ban on research using cells or tissue for human
cloning); H.R. 824, 89th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (banning the use of state
funds for research with respect to human cloning); H.J.R. 28, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Md.
1997) (banning the use of state funds for cloning human beings); H.R. 932, 1998
Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998) (prohibiting state funding for human cloning); S. 1243, 90th
Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (111. 1997) (banning the cloning of human beings and estab-
lishing administrative penalties for those who do so, including civil monetary penal-
ties and revocation of a sperm bank's registration); H.R. 675, 122nd Leg., 1997-98
1999]
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1997, announced the prohibition of federal funding for cloning
human beings.30 Stating that "human cloning would have to raise
deep concerns, given our most cherished concepts of faith and hu-
manity." Clinton issued a directive that "no federal agency may
support, fund, or undertake such activity." 31 He also called for a
voluntary moratorium, in the entire scientific and medical commu-
nity, on attempts to clone human beings through privately funded
projects. Believing that a voluntary moratorium is not sufficient,
many state and federal legislators have proposed bills specifically
banning the cloning of humans regardless of the funding source.32
Additionally, a couple of states have passed laws creating state
advisory boards on the issue, similar to the President's National
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997) (prohibiting the cloning of human beings); S. 8, 1998 Reg.
Sess. (Ala. 1998) (making the cloning of a human being a Class B felony); S. 68,
1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998) (making the cloning of a human being a Class B felony);
S. 1344, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (prohibiting the cloning of human beings);
S. 218, 122nd Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1997) (making the cloning of human
beings a crime subject to a penatly of up to five hundred thousand dollars per viola-
tion); A.B. 9116, 221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (prohibiting a person from
cloning a human being); S. 5993, 221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (prohibit-
ing a person from cloning a human being); H.R. 2235, 90th Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 1997) (prohibiting the cloning of human beings and the use of public funds to
clone human beings); A.B. 9183, 221st Leg. 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (prohibit-
ing human cloning and the use of public funds, resources, property, or employees in
furtherance of human cloning).
30 President's Press Conference Remarks Announcing the Prohibition on Fed-
eral Funding for Cloning of Human Beings, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 278, 279
(Jan. 6, 1997) (encouraging private and public communities alike to stop all efforts at
human cloning until its ethical implications can be better understood).
31 Id. (urging the entire scientific and medical community to use caution con-
cerning human cloning).
32 See, e.g., S. 511, 1997 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1997) (making human cloning a Class
B felony); S. 1344, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (providing a complete ban, with
monetary penalty, on human cloning); H.R. 2235, 90th Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. § 5
(111. 1997) (prohibiting cloning regardless of funding); H.R. 1829, 90th Leg., 1997-98
Reg. Sess. (111. 1997) (prohibiting the use of public funds or property for purposes of
human cloning within Illinois); A.B. 2849, 207th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.J.
1996) (imposing fines of up to $100,000 and/or imprisonment of ten to twenty years
for engaging or assisting in human cloning); S. 2877, 220th Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1997) (prohibiting cloning by any method and without reference to funding
source); S. 782, 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1997) (making it a Class E felony to clone, or
conspire to clone, a human being); S. 1017, 69th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. § I (Ore.
1997) (prohibiting the cloning of human beings); S. 410, 73rd Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 1997) (making human cloning a felony punishable by a fine of up to $10,000
and/or one to five years imprisonment).
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Bioethics Advisory Commission, to investigate the technology and
provide legislative recommendations.33
Another source of possible government regulation of human
cloning endeavors is likely to come from the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA). The acting FDA Commissioner, Michael A.
Friedman, stated in an interview on January 20, 1998, that the
FDA has the authority to regulate any human cloning research.34
The FDA asserts authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act35 because the "kinds of manipulations involved in human
cloning present[s] 'serious health and safety issues."' 36 As of the
date of this writing, however, the FDA has not specifically indi-
cated where in the Act it finds the authority to regulate human
cloning efforts, especially those of privately funded research.
Additionally, the concept of cloning humans is under attack
on an international level. Several countries including Spain, Brit-
ain, Germany, Denmark, and Australia have enacted national leg-
islation banning any aspect of human cloning.37 On January 12,
1998, the Council of Europe enacted an international treaty that
would also ban the cloning of human beings in response to the re-
cent scientific developments in the field of mammal cloning.
38
Building on the provisions of the Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine, the Council of Europe followed standards which
formed "clear barriers against the misuse of human embryos. 39
33 See, e.g., S. 5503, 221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (creating tempo-
rary state commission on cloning and genetic engineering); S. Con. Res. 39, 1997-98
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997) (establishing a panel to advise legislature on human cloning).
34 Feds: Cloning Is Regulated/FDA Says Procedure Requires Approval, NEWS -
DAY, Jan. 21, 1998, at A20, available in 1998 WL 2655132 (reporting on the FDA's
assertion that it has the authority to regulate human cloning under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act).
" 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
36 Feds: Cloning Is Regulated/FDA Says Procedure Requires Approval, supra
note 34.
37 See KOLATA, supra note 8, at 32.
38 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and
Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, opened for signature Jan.
12, 1998, ETS No. 168 [hereinafter European Protocol on Cloning] (agreement be-
tween Member States of the Council of Europe, other states, and the European Com-
munity signatories, to prohibit cloning). The Protocol is also available on the Council
of Europe's Web site at <http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/168e.htm> (visited Jan. 22,
1999).
39 Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Appli-
1999]
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Thus, the treaty prohibits any intervention which seeks to create a
human being genetically identical to another human, whether liv-
ing or dead. 40 To date, twenty-four of the Council's member coun-
tries, but none of the non-member invitees, have signed the agree-
ment.41 The treaty will become effective when five countries, in-
cluding four member countries, have ratified the agreement. 42 It is
difficult to speculate exactly when, if ever, the treaty will become
effective because there is no set procedure for the signing coun-
tries to follow. Each individual country must follow and complete
its own political process for ratifying an international treaty.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED
IN CLONING HUMAN BEINGS
A. Cloning for Reproductive Purposes
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the right to
procreative liberty as an extension of the right to privacy in the
landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut.43 The Griswold court, fo-
cusing on a married couple's right to privacy in family planning,
held that the decision whether or not to bear a child was protected
under the constitutional right to privacy.44 In 1972, however, the
Court extended this right to individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird
which states that, "[if] the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally af-
fecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 45
cation of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, (vis-
ited Jan. 26, 1999) <http:llwww.coe.fr/oviedo/rapl68e.htm>.
40 See European Protocol on Cloning, supra note 38, art. 1 (prohibiting the crea-
tion of a human being who would have the same nuclear gene set as that of another
human being).
41 See Council of Europe, Chart of Signature and Ratifications (last updated
Dec. 22, 1998) <http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/168t.htm>. Signing members include
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia, and Turkey. See id.
42 See id. As of Dec. 22, 1998, three signatories have ratified the agreement:
Greece, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See id.
4' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44 Id. at 485-86.
45 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (describing the case where a
Boston University professor appealed his conviction of violating Massachusetts law,
[Vol. 9:311
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This "recognized protection accorded to the liberty relating to in-
timate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or
not to beget or bear a child," was recently reaffirmed by the Court
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.46
Although the Supreme Court's rulings in Griswold and Eisen-
stadt were issued before the advent of most assisted reproductive
technologies, the decisions are so broad as to arguably encompass
these assisted reproductive technologies. 47 In fact, a federal district
court has interpreted the right to make procreative decisions to in-
clude the right of an infertile couple to undergo medically assisted
reproduction, including the use of in vitro fertilization and a do-
nated embryo.a The Supreme Court, however, denied certiorari in
the case. Absent a decision by the Court addressing assisted repro-
ductive technologies, it is unclear whether the choice to create a
child through cloning would be viewed in the same light as the
fundamental right to procreative liberty. Since cloning for repro-
ductive purposes, via somatic cell nuclear transfer, would involve
bringing a child into the world, "it is quite possible that one could
characterize it as a form of procreation, for which the courts have
carved out large areas of special protection. 49
which made it a felony to provide contraceptives to unmarried persons, for giving a
single woman contraceptive foam after his lecture to students on contraception).
46 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992) (describing the case where abor-
tion clinics and physicians challenged the constitutionality of the 1988 and 1989
amendments to the Pennsylvania abortion statute on due process grounds).
47 See Christi D. Ahnen, Comment, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins,
Who Loses, and How Do We Decide?, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299, 1308 (1991)
(stating that it is "inconsistent that a society would recognize the right of the fertile to
conceive coitally, and not also recognize the right of the unfertile to conceive non-
coitally").
48 See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill.) (holding that a ban on
research of contraceptives was unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringed
upon a woman's right to privacy), aff'd sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991).
49 NBAC, supra note 1, at 92 (stating that "it is necessary to examine whether
the choice to create a child via somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning would be viewed
as a fundamental liberty"). See also A Ban on Cloning and Cloning Research is Un-
justified, 1997 2 BIOLAw (Univ. Pub. Am.) No. 6, at S:135, S:135-37 (June 1997)
(providing selections from John A. Robertson's testimony before the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission on March 14, 1997, arguing that cloning is not
qualitatively different from the practice of medically assisted reproduction and ge-
netic selection that is currently occurring); John A. Robertson, Human Cloning:
Should the United States Legislate Against It? No: The Potential for Good is Too
Compelling, ABA J., May 1997, at 81 (arguing that a ban on cloning is unjustified
because it is not substantively different from prebirth genetic selection techniques
that are currently in use).
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The reproductive right relevant to human cloning is a negative
right, that is the right to use assisted reproductive technologies
without fear of government interference. This right can be in-
cluded in the concept of reproductive freedom even when it is not
the only means of having a child via assisted reproductive tech-
nologies.50 Whereas the right to reproductive freedom has tradi-
tionally been thought of as the right to choose between various
methods of preventing pregnancy, the right to reproductive free-
dom arguably includes the right to take affirmative steps, through
the use of assisted reproductive technologies, to become pregnant.
Arguably, when infertile individuals have a choice between differ-
ent methods of medically assisted reproduction, human cloning
would be favored because it replicates a particular individual's
genome.51 Thus, for individuals looking to have a child genetically
related to them, cloning, if successful, would be a viable alterna-
tive even when it is not the only means for those individuals to
have a child through medical assistance.
Additionally, the right to reproductive freedom is generally
understood to cover some element of choice about the kind, and
number, of children a person will have. In the case of choosing
cloning for reproductive purposes over other assisted reproductive
technologies, the interest in question is not simply reproduction
itself, but a more specific interest in choosing what kind of child to
have. 52 Unfortunately, not all individuals have the choice to decide
between different methods of assisted reproduction. The case for
permitting cloning as a means of reproduction is strongest, there-
fore, when it would be the only way for an individual to procreate
while retaining a biological tie to the child.53
The Supreme Court has not left the right to privacy and repro-
ductive freedom unchecked, however. The Court has held that in-
dividual states can regulate or limit reproductive rights, but only if
there is a compelling state interest in doing so.54 If cloning is held
'0 See Dan W. Brock, An Assesment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con, in 2
CLONING HUMAN BEINGS, supra note 1, at El, E4-5 (presenting arguments in favor of
cloning as a reproductive freedom).
51 See id. (noting that couples' reproductive choices have been expanded to
include what kind of children to have).
52 See id. (comparing cloning to other methods of artificial reproduction, such as
in vitro fertilization, oocyte donation, and surrogacy).
" See id.
54 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (stating that a State has to
prove that there is a compelling interest in regulating a fundamental right and that the
regulation must be the most "narrowly drawn means of achieving that end," while
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to be within a constitutionally protected fundamental right, in-
cluded in reproductive freedom and the right to privacy originally
outlined in Griswold, any attempt by the states to regulate the
technology would be tested against the strictest scrutiny of the ju-
dicial system. In order to pass constitutional muster, a state's leg-
islation "prohibiting the ability to clone or prohibiting [cloning]
research would have to further a compelling interest in the least
restrictive manner possible in order to survive this standard of re-
view."55 (Emphasis added).
A state may have the power to regulate cloning for reproduc-
tive purposes based on its role as parens patriae,56 due to its quasi-
sovereign interests in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens. Thus, a state may assert the power to regulate cloning
based on its concern for the health and safety of the cloned child
during the process. The advent of cloning, however, would not ne-
cessitate an expansion of the power states currently assert over as-
sisted reproductive technologies. Human cloning, consistent with
other reproductive technologies, would arguably be regulated un-
der a state's statutory provisions aimed at protecting the health and
safety of its citizens with respect to obtaining medical treatment
(in addition to State Medical Board standards that are applicable).
While there may be debate as to the moral and ethical differences
between current technology and cloning, the science of cloning is
actually taken from various techniques used in currently practiced
forms of assisted reproduction and medical science. Therefore, the
nature of the science involved in cloning is not so diverse from
other reproductive technologies to require an expansion of a state's
power to protect the parties involved.
finding that no such fundamental right extends to homosexuals who engage in sexual
relations, based on the majority's view that such acts are immoral). See generally
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding a Missouri
statute prohibiting the use of public funds, employees, and facilities for the purpose
of encouraging, assisting, or performing abortions not necessary to save a woman's
life, based on the premise that life begins at conception).
55 Lori B. Andrews, Cloning Human Beings: The Current and Future Legal
Status of Cloning, in 2 CLONING HuMAN BEINGS, supra note 1, Fl, F37 (looking into
the legal aspects of future and current challenges to human cloning and what poten-
tial standards states may face when creating laws).
56 "Refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons
under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990).
1999]
HEALTH MATRIX
B. Cloning for Non-Reproductive Purposes
There are a number of individuals who argue in favor of
cloning humans for non-reproductive purposes. 57 Among the pur-
poses discussed for which human cloning could have a pronounced
effect are disease research and prevention as well as organ and tis-
sue supply. Currently, molecular and cellular biologists use clon-
ing technology to create cell lines for research that have had an
enormous effect on medicine in recent history.58 One of the most
attractive potential applications of non-reproductive cloning, how-
ever, is to increase the supply of organs and tissues for transplan-
tation.
1. Cloning Entire Human Beings
Human cloning could solve the problem of finding a trans-
plant donor who is an acceptable organ or tissue match, and as a
result could drastically reduce the risk of transplant rejection by
the host. In fact, prior to the discovery of immunosupressive drugs
to help combat the rejection of a transplanted organ by a host, do-
nation from one identical twin to another had, by far, the highest
57 See, e.g., Brock, supra note 50, at 7-11 (noting that human cloning has several
individual and social benefits, such as protection against the transmission of serious
hereditary diseases and the ability to clone other individuals with great talent or other
exemplary qualities); NIH Director Plays Down Cloning Effect, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 27,
1997, at A9 (describing how cloning technology could be useful not for reproduction,
but for researching disease treatment); Charles Krauthammer, A Special Report on
Cloning, TIME, Mar. 10, 1997, at 60, 61 (arguing that cloning has potential benefits in
that it may give "the world deep insights into puzzles such as spinal cords, heart mus-
cle, and brain tissue, that won't regenerate after injury"); Thomas H. Maugh II, Brave
New World, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1997, at B2 (reporting the desire of Scottish re-
searcher, Dr. Ian Wilmut, to use cloning for genetic engineering of animals); Carol
Kahn, Can We Achieve Immortality?: The Ethics of Cloning and Other Life-
Extension Technologies, FREE INQUIRY, Spring 1989, at 14, 15 (discussing seven
"life-extension" sciences, including cloning, and arguing that brain-absent human
clones would be beneficial in supplying biological materials that are genetically
identical to the intended recipient); JoHN HARRIS, WONDERWOMAN AND SUPERMAN:
THE ETmIcs oF BIOTECHNOLOGY (1992) (arguing that the question should not be
whether or not to clone, but how and to what extent); Jeffrey Kluger, Will We Follow
the Sheep?, TIME, Mar. 10, 1997, at 67 (arguing that, "[i]f the human gene pool can
be seen as a sort of species-wide natural resource, it is only sensible for the rarest of
genes to be... preserved").
58 See NBAC, supra note 1, at 14 (discussing the use of cloning technology as
the mainstay of recombinant DNA technology which has lead to the production of
insulin for diabetic treatment and maintenance, tissue plasminogen activator (tPA)
that dissolves blood clots after heart attacks, and erythropoietin (EPO) that treats
anemia associated with dialysis for kidney disease).
[Vol. 9:311
IGNORANCE IS NOT BLISS
probability and rate of success. By cloning humans for organ or
tissue donation, we would be creating a "'delayed' genetic twin,,
59
dramatically increasing the probability of a successful transplant.
As with cloning for reproductive purposes, cloning humans
for organ and tissue donors raises serious legal and ethical issues.
The concept has been criticized on the ground that it treats the de-
layed genetic twin as simply a means for benefiting another, not as
a loved and valued child for its own sake. In a well-publicized case
from 1990, the parents of a nineteen-year-old suffering with leu-
kemia chose to have another child in hopes of obtaining a source
for a bone marrow transplant.6° The Ayalas, a California couple,
jumped through medical hoops to conceive a daughter, and a suc-
cessful match for their nineteen-year-old's bone marrow.61 Around
the same time, another couple from Indiana chose to immediately
attempt to have another child in order to provide fetal stem cells to
their newborn, who had been diagnosed with Fanconi's anemia.
62
The first fetus miscarried, but the mother waited a month and got
pregnant again. When this child was born, she was an unsuitable
donor. Twelve weeks later, the mother was pregnant again, this
time with a child who turned out to be compatible. In both cases,
each of these families argue that whether or not the child they con-
ceived turned out to be a possible donor (as was the case for the
Indiana couple), they would value and love the child for itself, and
treat it as they would any member of their family.
It is not just the newspaper headlines and magazine articles
that report on cases like those noted above. Several cases have
been decided in the courts on whether a child will be allowed to
59 See id. at 3 (defining a "delayed" genetic twin as "a new individual geneti-
cally identical to an existing (or previously existing) person").
60 See Lance Morrow, When One Body Can Save Another: A Family's Act of
Lifesaving Conception Was on the Side of Angels, but Hovering in the Wings is the
Devilish Ghost of Dr. Mengele, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 54 (providing a real-life il-
lustration of the debate over whether it is "morally acceptable for parents to conceive
a child in order to obtain an organ or tissue to save the life of another one of their
children").
61 The father underwent surgery to reverse a vasectomy (a procedure with a 40%
success rate), and the mother became pregnant at the age of 43, knowing that the
odds were one in four that the baby's bone marrow would match. See id.
62 See id. at 58 (describing the story of Lea Ann and Brad Curry, who conceived
two successive children in hopes of finding a successful donor match to their first-




donate needed organs or tissue to a sibling.63 While these cases
deal primarily with existing children, not the concept of conceiv-
ing a child for donation purposes, the moral and legal arguments
are similar. It is important to note, however, that the lack of case
law on situations such as the Ayala's does imply that there is a
definite difference between subjecting an existing child to dona-
tion and creating one for that purpose. Arguably, the fact that legal
action has not been filed against families like the Ayalas demon-
strates that the government (in its parens patriae role) does not
feel there is a sufficient reason to press criminal charges in these
situations. Thus, in cases like the Ayala's, the fundamental right to
privacy and reproductive freedom appears to make it legally ac-
ceptable for the couple to conceive a child for donation purposes.
If cloning is held protected under procreative liberty, cloning for
purposes of having a child that is an acceptable organ donor would
fall under that protection as well.
The idea of parents being allowed to consent to donation be-
tween naturally occurring identical twins has been addressed in the
courts. In Hart v. Brown,64 the Superior Court of Connecticut al-
lowed the parents of identical seven-year-old twins to consent to
the donation of a kidney from one twin to the other who was in the
hospital waiting for a transplant. Noting that the kidney was a ne-
cessity for continued life to one twin, and that the risks of the op-
eration to both twins were negligible, the court acknowledged the
preference for isografts, "one-egg twin graft[s] from one to an-
other."
65
63 Compare Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969) (permitting a kidney
to be removed from a twenty-seven-year-old incompetent for transplantation into his
brother who was suffering from a fatal kidney disease); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (permitting parents of seven-year-old twins to give consent
to the donation of a kidney by one identical twin child to the other); Little v. Little,
576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App. 1979) (allowing the mother of a 14-year-old incompetent
to give consent to the donation of a kidney to a younger sibling); with In re Guardian-
ship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975) (refusing to authorize the donation of
a kidney by an incompetent adult to his sister); Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319
(1l1. 990) (refusing to require three-and-one-half-year-old twins to undergo a bone
marrow-harvesting procedure to determine if they were acceptable matches for a half-
brother suffering from leukemia), In re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185 (La. Ct. App.
1973) (refusing to adopt the doctrine of substituted judgment, thereby refusing to
authorize the donation of a kidney by a seventeen-year-old incompetent boy to his
sister, even though parental consent existed).
64 289 A.2d at 386.
65 Id. at 388.
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Isografts, because the twin carries the same genetic material,
do not present the problems with rejection that even parental ho-
mografts involve. Therefore, cloning a human and creating a de-
layed genetic twin would truly be the best way to ensure the ac-
ceptance of an organ outside of naturally occurring identical twins,
because it would provide an isograft where nature had not done so.
It has been argued that the "availability of human cloning for this
purpose would amount to a form of insurance policy to enable
treatment of certain kinds of medical needs." 66
Additionally, it has been held that a parent may consent on
behalf of a minor child for the child to donate bone marrow to a
sibling when doing so would be in the minor's best interest.67 The
court in Curran v. Bosze stated that critical factors for determining
what would be in the best interest of a minor child are:
(1) the consenting parent is informed of the risks and benefits
inherent in the bone marrow-harvesting procedure to the
child; (2) there must be emotional support available to the
child from the persons who are responsible for the care of the
child; and (3) there must be an existing close relationship
between the donor and recipient.68
Many courts equate an "existing close relationship" with the
"substantial benefit" to the donor in determining what is in the do-
nor's best interests.69 In order to find an existing close relationship,
66 Brock, supra note 50, at E8 (exploring the moral implications of cloning
solely for organ donation and transplantation).
67 See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d at 1331 (holding that minors could not be
required to donate bone marrow over the objections of their mother, where it was not
in the children's best interest).
68 Id. at 1343 (discussing the criteria the court used to determine whether it is in
the best interest of a minor to donate bone marrow to a sibling).
69 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146-147 (Ky. 1969) (describing how
the dependent relationship between the incompetent brother and the donee brother
has greater substantial benefit if the donation takes place than if it does not); see also
In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. 1975) (explaining that
there must be a showing of real consent by, or a benefit to, an incompetent adult be-
fore the court will permit the incompetent adult to donate a kidney to a sibling); Little
v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 498-500 (Tex. App. 1979) (describing how the existing
close relationship between donor sister and donee brother resulted in substantial
benefit to both); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (noting
that it would be beneficial to a donor sibling to give her identical twin sister a kidney,
thus saving her sister's life); Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1343 (discussing the types
of benefits to a child who donates bone marrow to a sibling).
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however, there must necessarily be an existing donor, who has had
the opportunity (and time) to form a close bond with the recipient.
Creating a child, or clone, for the purposes of being an organ do-
nor does not implicate the need to find an existing relationship for
a finding of benefit to the donor. The relationship that will exist
between the donor and donee siblings will only be formed after the
donor gives the needed organ to save the donee's life.
There is additional authority in case law to support the idea
that even "nontheraputic operations can be legally permitted on a
minor as long as the parents or other guardians consent to the pro-
cedure.,, 70 In Bonner v. Moran, the court determined that the par-
ents of a fifteen-year-old boy could consent to his skin grafting in
order to donate the tissue to his severely burned cousin.71 In a time
when skin homografting-transferring was a new procedure, the
court stated that knowing exactly what was involved required a
"mature mind." Because of this requirement, parental consent was
necessary.72 Interestingly, Bonner allows for donation by a minor
to a relative who is not a sibling when there is parental consent. In
light of this fact, there is a much stronger argument for donation
by a sibling with parental consent, or delayed genetic twin in the
case of cloning, due to the increase in success rates of isografts,
along with the increased "benefit" to the donor in the long-term by
having saved her sibling's life.
2. Cloning Less Than a Whole Person
Some have argued for the proposition of cloning less than a
whole person to solve situations where the needed organ may be
vital to the donor's life, such as a heart.73 For instance, Carol Kahn
argues that after cell differentiation, "some of the brain cells of the
embryo or fetus would be removed so that it could then be grown
70 Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d at 386, 390 (Conn. 1972) (citing Bonner v. Moran,
126 F.2d at 121(D.C. Cir. 1941)) (involving the consent necessary to permit skin
grafting from a 15-year old to his cousin).
71 126 F.2d at 121 (deciding that consent of the parent is necessary when a child
is to undergo a surgical operation for the benefit of another and requires a mature
mind to understand what the child has done).
72 Id. at 123 (stating that the appreciation of the nature and consequences of a
complex surgical procedure requires more than that of a child's limited understanding
and therefore requires a surgeon to gain consent of the parent or guardian prior to
operating on a child).
73 See Kahn, supra note 57, at 17 (suggesting reasons in favor of cloning hu-
mans for non-reproductive purposes).
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as a brain-dead body for spare parts for its earlier twin."74 Thus, a
"body clone" would be analogous to an anencephalic newborn75 or
presentient fetus, 76 neither of whom can arguably be harmed be-
cause of their lack of capacity for consciousness. "[If one pushes
what is already science fiction quite a bit further. . the ability to
clone and grow in an artificial environment only the particular life-
saving organ a person needed for transplantation," would not be
that difficult to imagine.77
The issue of anencephalic newborns as organ donors does of-
fer some useful comparisons to cloning less than an entire person.
Some courts have held that these children are not "dead. 78 How-
ever, the condition is invariably fatal, with more than ninety-five
percent of those who survive birth dying within one week.79 In the
United States, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) requires
that an individual be declared dead before organs can be pro-
cured.80 The definition of death, according to the Uniform Deter-
mination of Death Act (UDDA), is either (1) the irreversible ces-
sation of heart rate and respiration, or (2) total brain death.81 Since
anencephalics are capable of maintaining both a heart beat and
respiration without medical assistance, they do not meet the tradi-
tional cardio-respiratory medical definition of death. 82 Addition-
74 Brock, supra note 50, at E8 (referencing Kahn, supra note 57).
75 Anencephaly is a birth defect in which the child typically is born with only a
brain stem, but otherwise lacks a human brain and most of the skull. According to the
Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, a diagnosis of anencephaly is only proper when
four criteria are present: "(1) A large portion of the skull is absent; (2) The scalp,
which extends to the margin of the bone, is absent over the skull defect; (3) Hemor-
rhagic, fibrotic tissue is exposed because of defects in the skull and scalp; [and] (4)
Recognizable cerebral hemispheres are absent." David A. Stumpf et al., The Infant
with Anencephaly, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 669, 670 (1990).
76 A fetus, who is not yet alert, cognizant, or able to have conscious thought.
77 Brock, supra note 50, at E8 (considering the future of cloning as a method of
obtaining organs for transplantation).
78 See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So.2d 588, 595 (Fla. 1992) (holding that an anence-
phalic newborn is not considered dead for purposes of organ donation solely by rea-
son of its congenital deformity).
79 See National Conference on Birth Death and Law, Report on Conference, 29
JURimETRICS J. 403, 422 (Lori B. Andrews et al., eds. 1989) (discussing the "diffi-
culty of finding sufficient organs for transplantation in young children" and the pos-
sibility of using anencephalic children as organ donors).
80 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act § 1(1), 8A U.L.A. 29 (1993) (establishing that
organs may be procured only after the death of the donor).
81 Uniform Determination of Death Act §1, 12A U.L.A. 593 (1993) (defining
death).
82 See Lisa E. Hanger, The Legal, Ethical, and Medical Objections to Procuring
Organs From Anencephalic Infants, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 347, 351 (1995) (explaining
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ally, because most anencephalics have active brain stems, they do
not fit into the definition of whole brain death.83 It is likely that the
problems with defining death under the traditional cardio-
respiratory cessation standard would also arise with body clones.
While they could be created requiring medical respiratory assis-
tance, body clones would need to have a functioning heart in order
to survive and keep the rest of the organs viable. The whole brain
definition of death, however, could resolve any debate because
body clones would be created without any part of a brain.
Since anencephalic infants lack cerebral hemispheres, it is
commonly believed that they are incapable of sensing pain, or de-
veloping any sort of cognitive process. Because of this fact, along
with the severe shortage of neonatal organ donors, the American
Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
(CEJA), revised its position on the removal of organs from anen-
cephalic neonates in June of 1994, finding that "[w]hile respect for
life is a value of utmost importance, it is not clear what implica-
tions that value has for the treatment of anencephalic neonates." 84
As a result, CEJA stated that it was ethically permissible to con-
sider the anencephalic infant a limited exception to the "dead do-
nor rule."8
5
In following CEJA's opinion, 86 it is ethically acceptable to
procure organs from anencephalics prior to their "death" as long as
parental consent is obtained, and certain safeguards are followed.
In fact, the Council stated that the value of life "is not an absolute
value in the sense of overriding all other values. Rather, it must be
balanced with other important social values, including, as in this
why the legal definitions of "life" and "death" need to be expanded in the case of
anencephalic infants).
83 See id. (further illustrating why the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act needs to be
revised with respect to anencephalic infants).
84 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, The Use of Anence-
phalic Neonates as Organ Donors, 273 JAMA 1614, 1616 (1995) (stating that the
reasoning for the "dead donor rule" may not apply with regard to anencephalic neo-
nates).
85 See id. at 1618 (stating that the lack of and inability to ever experience con-
sciousness qualifies anencephalic neonates as potential donors as a limited exception
to the "dead donor rule").
86 COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRs, AMERIcAN MEDICAL Asso-
CIATION, CODE OF MED. ETHics: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS 33 (1996)
(outlining formal opinion 2.162 describing anencephaly and when organs may be
retrieved from such infants and used for transplant).
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case, the fundamental social value of saving lives. ' 7 Therefore, if
it is ethically permissible to procure organs from anencephalics,
would it not also be permissible to procure organs from a clone
that is created in much the same medical state as an anencephalic?
Arguably, the social value of saving lives would be better served,
and substantially outweigh the value of the donor's life according
to CEJA's balancing test, by creating an identical organ match,
instead of procuring an organ from a non-related donor.
Currently, in order for organs to be preserved for transplant,
the donor's cardiopulmonary system must be kept functioning until
the organs can be removed. This can involve hours, or possibly
days, of artificial respiratory assistance before the organs are
matched and an accepting recipient is located. In such a case, is
there a difference between keeping a person's body going, without
brain activity, for the purpose of harvesting organs, and creating a
body in theoretically the same state for the same purpose? While
most people would likely find this practice appalling, there are
many practical arguments for allowing the technique. Currently,
over 64,000 of them are awaiting transplants in the United States.88
Additionally, if the science of cloning is allowed to proceed, the
technology could one day be perfected to the point where scientists
are able to clone specific needed parts. In such a scenario, the sci-
ence of cloning would then have moved into a more morally and
ethically permissible state where children or body clones are not
the most effective way of procuring a needed organ. Unfortu-
nately, if the technology is prohibited at its current early stage of
development, society will never know the full potential, or be able
to reap the full benefits, of cloning human beings.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The constantly increasing number of proposed laws, inspired
by the rush to prohibit the morally unacceptable and regulate the
unknown, are especially troublesome. The bills do not suffer from
the problem of unconstitutional vagueness since the activity they
ban, cloning, is explicitly described. The problem arises from the
fact that cloning is described in different ways in different legisla-
tion. This could lead to definitional problems "similar to those en-
87 Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 84, at
1616.
88 LEEBANC FAcT SHEm (Jan. 1999) (stating statistics of organ transplant de-




countered in the fetal research laws as new variations of the tech-
nology are developed that may not exactly fit into the current
cloning definition." 89
In addition, the bills present differing definitions about what
constitutes an embryo, thus taking the cloning issue into the "when
does life begin?" debate most often associated with abortion. (Not
to mention that the language of the bills tread dangerously close to
prohibiting currently acceptable reproductive technologies and re-
search studies.) Arguably, cloning for reproductive purposes
would not change current laws addressing the issue. The point of
life for a clone would not necessarily be different than that cur-
rently associated with children produced by other assisted repro-
ductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization and artificial
insemination. Additionally, the cloning of specific organs would
not implicate the issue of "life" because a living person would not
be created, only the needed part.
Finally, there is no consistency between bills or states as to
who would be prohibited from cloning. In most cases, the legisla-
tion generally prohibits cloning, without reference to whether the
scientists and the people seeking the ability to be cloned are both
targets. Some states, however, have drafted more recent legislation
that do state, and attempt to direct, the penalties of breaking the
proposed law.9° Inconsistency, however, will likely only confuse
individuals or scientists about the state of the law between juris-
dictions. It will also produce a situation where individuals may be
89 Andrews, supra note 55, at F22 (pointing out definitional problems that go
with legislating a new area in science and technology, where laws governing the
same subject can be interpreted in vastly different ways).
90 See, e.g., H.R. 2235, 90th Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (111. 1997) (creating the
Human Cloning Prohibition Act and stating that violating the Act would be a Class 4
felony); S. 1243, 90th Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (IMI. 1997) (creating the Human
Cloning Act prohibiting a person from purchasing or selling an ovum, zygote, em-
bryo, or fetus for the purpose of cloning a human being, and stating that violating the
Act would be a Class 4 felony); S. 2877, 221st Leg., 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997)
(amending the penal law to make cloning a Class D felony, and conspiracy to clone, a
Class E felony); A.B. 5383, 221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (prohibiting the
extracting of the nucleus from any unfertilized human egg and infusing into such egg
DNA from any other cell, and creating a new crime of cloning as a Class D felony);
A.B. 9116, 221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (prohibiting a "person" from
cloning a human being and establishing civil penalties for doing so); A.B. 9183,
221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (prohibiting all persons and other entities
from engaging in, participating in, or financing human cloning and stating that viola-
tions of the bill constitute a felony and grounds for license revocation); and S. 5993,
221st Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1997) (establishing a civil penalty for cloning
human beings).
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"shopping" for facilities in states with laws amenable to their de-
sire for cloning. In such a situation, these individuals may not re-
ceive the best care, due to long-distance travel to and from the
cloning facility and the possible lack of local emergency care in
case of complications.
A large part of the rush to legislate cloning can be attributed
to two things: (1) a fear of the unknown, and (2) ignorance as to
the science involved in cloning. Fiction, such as the novels, Brave
New World91 and The Boys from Brazil,92 depicts cloning as a
source of creating inhuman people, and bringing back the dead. In
fact, one of the most common fallacies associated with cloning is
that it would be a means of recreating exemplary or evil people,
thus allowing scientists to create a basketball team full of Michael
Jordans, a science lab full of Albert Einsteins, or an army of Adolf
Hitlers. Although genes do provide the building blocks for indi-
viduals, and cloning would necessarily replicate an individual's
genes, the idea that cloning could be used to re-create evil, or even
exemplary people simply has no scientific basis.93 Environment
plays an enormous role in the development of children. The expo-
sure and experiences a child receives will vary between different
cultures, socio-economic classes, religions, decades, and countless
other environmental factors.
The United States should not rush to ban human cloning tech-
nology. While there may be legitimate arguments and cause for
concern regarding the need to regulate the procedure in order to
ensure that the highest quality of medical standards are met, a ban
is not in the best interest of society as a whole. Cloning could cre-
ate new alternatives in reproductive technology, help decrease the
need for organ donors (not to mention the reduction in host rejec-
tion), and open the scientific and medical world to possibilities
that have not even been contemplated. A ban, as currently contem-
91 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEw WORLD (1946) (imagining cloning individuals
who have been engineered with limited abilities and conditioned to do the menial
work that society needed done).
92 IRA LEvIN, THE Boys FROM BRAZIL (1976) (depicting Dr. Mengele's disturb-
ing creation of many clones of Hitler).
93 See NBAC, supra note I, at 2 (explaining that genes are the building blocks
of each individual, but it is the interaction of genes, environment, and learning that
make each individual unique); see also John A. Robertson, The Question of Human
Cloning, HAsTINGS CENTR REP., Mar. - Apr. 1994, at 6, 11 (stating that "because
phenotype and genotype do diverge, and because the environment in which the child




plated by the U.S. Congress as well as many state legislatures,
would effectively close the door to this technology forever. The
potential for good, as one cloning advocate argues, 94 is too com-
pelling.
94 See A Ban on Cloning and Cloning Research is Unjustified, supra note 49, at
S:139 (arguing that the good uses for cloning technology should not be stymied by a
ban that is based upon "vague and highly speculative fears").
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